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Legitimacy Deficits Beyond the State: Diagnoses and Cures
Andreas Føllesdal
Should the terms and institutions of normative legitimacy and legitimation apply to entities 'beyond the state', international or transnational public or private bodies in general, and the European Union (EU) in particular?
1 The present chapter argues for an affirmative answer. It first offers a condensed overview of the current debate concerning the European Union, and then develops an account of legitimacy and legitimation for that multilevel political order. This account is defended on the basis of a particular normative political theory. In normative political theory, one central sense of 'legitimacy' is the normative assessment of regimes, particular institutions, officials' actions, or policies with an eye to whether they are justifiable. If so, those subject to the arrangements -for instance citizens -have a moral obligation to obey these institutions or officials. They are said to have a 'political obligation' (see Klosko in this volume). Are such questions of normative legitimacy also appropriate for international or supranational bodies? And are the standard answers familiar from political theory appropriate for such bodies, such as requirements of institutional arrangements for human rights review and democracy in particular?
On the account laid out here, a normative duty to obey political commands requires, first, that the commands, rulers, and regime are normatively legitimate, and second, that citizens also have reason to trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with such commands and regimes. Institutions can provide much in the way of providing assurance of these two conditions. For this reason, institutions that provide democratically competitive elections and human rights are often valuable parts of normatively legitimate political orders.
In Europe and beyond, these institutional arrangements for legitimation have come to be necessary to normative legitimacy -even almost by definition. The use of public power must be constrained by human rights, in the form of national or international judicial review. Decisions may be taken by authorities in a variety of institutions, but they must in the end be held accountable to democratically elected representatives who can be replaced by citizens on the basis of free deliberation and competition, and universal vote. The sustained violation or absence of human rights and democratic rules is said to justify civil disobedience, secession, or even revolution. It remains a contested issue whether similar standards of legitimacy are appropriate beyond the state.
The academic and political debates about the legitimacy deficit of the European Union have, particularly, revealed deep disagreements about alleged symptoms, diagnosis, and prescriptions to alleviate such a deficit as there might be. This chapter first considers the claim, only to deny it, that attempts at applying considerations of legitimacy to such bodies are fundamentally misguided. Its second section seeks to provide an overview of these disagreements, and then offers some suggestions for how to alleviate those deficits that there may be. 2 The third section lays out one taxonomy -of several 3 -that takes the literature to address at least six different objects of legitimacy at varying levels of generality. We find four different fundamental concepts of what legitimacy is about, and the literature considers at least four institutional means of legitimation for expressing or achieving such legitimacy. The fourth section offers some reflections on how institutions may bolster the requisite forms of legitimacy, especially democratic accountability, and indicates some of the main challenges that face efforts to enhance the democratic legitimacy of international and transnational bodies.
Is 'legitimacy' inappropriate as a standard beyond the state?
Critics may hold that 'legitimacy' proper is a term that can only be applied to sovereign states, and not to international or transnational bodies. 'Legitimacy' simply does not apply to such sorts of things. To ask whether the EU is legitimate is a question that cannot be asked about such entities, similarly to 'what color is the EU'. The question mistakes the category of what the EU or other transnational bodies are.
I submit against this that the issue of normative legitimacy is not inappropriate. Consider first the best arguments for the claim that legitimacy involves a category mistake. One way to detect category mistakes is that the question has an air of absurdity (Ryle 1949, 16-17; 1971; 184;  see also Thomasson in Ͻhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categoriesϾ). I contend that there is no theory-independent or theorist-independent test of absurdity for this issue. Some scholars may doubt that the EU is an entity whose legitimacy may be challenged, while others -and more so as the EU grows in competences -find the issue urgent. Thus there is no agreement on whether such issues are absurd -the literature surveyed below gives evidence that many learned scholars of the EU find the issue perplexing rather than absurd.
Others might argue that the international space is one of anarchyanomic in the sense that no rules are generally complied with, that there is no adjudication, no monitoring, and no sanctioning authority. Under such circumstances considerations about legitimacy are inappropriate and irrelevant at best. In response, I submit that the relevant senses and actual extent of international anarchy are hotly contested. Authors typically confuse (a) lack of common government, (b) insignificance of institutions, (c) chaos/Hobbesian 'war of all against all' (Wendt 1992; Keohane 1995). Moreover, there is a long-standing tradition that holds that elements of anarchy do not eliminate principles for legitimate action, but rather affect the content of these principles. A second line of response is that even though some areas of international relations have features characteristic of anarchy, some issue areas and geographic domains are less anarchic. In these areas, states follow common rules and have arrangements to monitor and even sanction agreements. The EU is of course a central case in point.
I conclude, therefore, that standards of legitimacy may well apply to the EU and international organizations. Thus the question of whether there is a legitimacy deficit in the EU, or in other political bodies beyond the state, merits careful scholarly attention. We turn to survey some of this literature.
Legitimacy deficit? Symptoms, diagnoses, and cures
During the last decades, many governments and EU officials have interpreted popular protests and sinking electoral turnout to mean that the legitimacy of the EU was at stake. Politicians gradually came to fear that Europeans might refuse to accept future steps toward deeper European integration, and otherwise hamper governability. The recent Convention on the Future of Europe was in part a response to these fears, to pre-empt such scenarios and bolster future popular support. Its rejection in French and Dutch referendums enhanced the fear among some that the legitimacy of the EU is at stake.
Yet scholars disagree strongly about the symptoms, diagnoses, and prognosis of whatever legitimacy deficit there might be. Alleged symptoms of a legitimacy deficit include empirical findings of negative popular attitudes toward the EU and normative assessments of its institutions. The symptoms range from Eurobarometer data on support for the existence of the European Community and of one's own country's membership in it (Karlsson 2001) (Hylland 1990, 118) , declining voter turnout for European Parliament elections (Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton 1995, discussed in Sbragia 1999) , and lack of parliamentary control of executive bodies at the EU level. The latter is seen as even more serious since the 1986 Single European Act which allows that any government representative could be outvoted by a qualified majority in the Council.
Some have sought to combine these empirical and normative approaches to legitimacy. So also with regard to the EU in particular. Christopher Lord and David Beetham argue that the same normative standards of legitimacy we know from liberal, democratic, and human rights respecting states should also apply to the EU, its complexity notwithstanding (Lord and Beetham 2001) . The EU has clearly fallen short of standards such as voter accountability and prominent human rights safeguards.
Many have challenged such diagnoses of a legitimacy deficit. Some question the symptoms. Public opinion polls showed falling support for European integration in the 1990s, but, in general, citizens are still highly in favour of European integration. Politicians are losing political support -but do so across advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 1999) . Likewise, the relatively low and falling participation rates in European Parliament elections should not surprise. Political parties tend to focus on domestic issues and national elections, and this leads the public to regard European issues and European elections as 'secondorder' with less salience than national elections. Some suggest that national party elites even collude against debates about European level choices of policy and institutions. They thus avoid internal splits on the divisive issues of European integration (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996) .
Some scholars even argue that the EU does not suffer from a legitimacy deficit, democratic or otherwise (Majone 1998a; Moravcsik 2002; but see Føllesdal and Hix 2006) . Others hold that there is no legitimacy crisis, but only the perception of one (Banchoff and Smith 1999a, 3) . Even crisis advocates diverge about the diagnoses. Some point to the lack of procedural 'input' legitimation due to citizens' lack of influence and control. Others lament the lack of 'output' legitimation: the mismatch between citizens' preferences and politicians' delivery, and the lack of political party contestation of central EU-level policies and matters of institutional design (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Føllesdal and Hix 2006) . Others, again, believe that the main problem is the creation of legitimacy deficits within member states that are no longer permitted or able to meet popular demands (Scharpf 1999) .
Some analysts are optimistic concerning the prognosis, while others warn against fixing something that 'ain't broke' (Weiler 2001) . There are even some suggestions to keep the democratic deficit (Gustavsson 1997) , while yet others call for a European superstate to solve it (Sieberson 2004) . Some claim to have seen traces of legitimating deliberation in 'comitology', while others worry that these extremely complex procedures for executing secondary legislation are part of the problem rather than a likely solution (Joerges and Vos 1999; Katz and Wessels 1999; Føllesdal 2005) . Others recommend that the EU focus on its role as a 'regulatory state', whose non-democratic independence bolsters the credibility of member states (Majone 1998b) . Some fear that lack of common language, media, or public discussions among the European citizenry will hinder efforts to enhance legitimacy, but they might disagree on the prospects of speedy improvements (Grimm 1995, 32; Habermas 1995 Habermas , 1996b Abromeit 1998) .
Unfortunately, different concepts of legitimacy support different, mutually incompatible prescriptions and proscriptions about institutional arrangements for legitimation. No wonder that reflective scholars, politicians, and civil servants hesitate about which medications to prescribe, be it more arenas of normatively salient deliberation, a written Constitution that simplifies structures of decision making, enhanced legal standing for the Charter of Fundamental Rights, expanding member-state discretion through the Open Method of Coordination, or a more efficient Commission that can better secure the European interest over the conflicting national interests. Some suggest strengthening the European Parliament. Others instead seek a stronger role for national parliaments (Neunreither 1994; but see Falkner and Nentwich 1995) .
Concepts, means, and objects of legitimacy and legitimation
In order to get a better grasp of the central normative concerns subsumed under worries about a 'legitimacy deficit', and to assess these cures, it may help to bring some order to these perplexing debates. The literature seems to use four different fundamental concepts of what legitimacy is about, at least four institutional means of legitimation for expressing or achieving such legitimacy, regarding at least six different objects of legitimacy at varying levels of generality.
Legitimacy as legality
States have created the European Union in accordance with all legal requirements (Weiler 1991; Wallace 1993; Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995; Lenaerts and Desomer 2002) . Democratic member states have transferred limited parts of their sovereignty by treaty, and may revoke that transfer, to form a de facto European constitutional order so as to better achieve their goals by coordinated action. The German Constitutional Court ruled on the legality of the Maastricht Treaty on the basis of this account -within limits. It found that the Union's authority is illegitimate when such limits are surpassed (Weiler 1995; Beetham and Lord 1998, 4) .
Legitimacy as compliance
Surely, compliance in the form of acquiescence may also stem from apathy, cynicism, or fear (Abromeit 1998). Yet there is a sense of social legitimacy as general compliance that seems close to Weber's account: 'the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform' (Weber 1972, 78-9) . And one main reason authorities are concerned about the alleged legitimacy deficit is no doubt a fear of non-compliance with EU regulations and implementation by other member-state governments or by citizens. These fears may seem overdrawn, given the broad social acceptance of European integration and the EU political system. Yet this acceptance varies and seems to decrease over time, reflecting circumstances and events (Karlsson 2001) . Active disobedience might not occur until politically relevant groups mobilize (Easton 1965) . Still, politicians may understandably want to reduce the risks of populations turning down treaties or refusing to comply.
Legitimacy as problem solving
The legitimacy of a political order is sometimes seen as a matter of whether it identifies and implements solutions to problems otherwise unattainable (Waldron 1987; Rawls 1993; Michelman 2000; see also Banchoff and Smith 1999b; Føllesdal 1998; Lehning 1997) . This concept of legitimacy as problem solving requires that preferred joint outcomes can only be obtained with the problem-solving capacity of the EU, and that they are in fact so identified, decided on, and secured. The EU suffers from the lack of such legitimacy when it obviously fails to find and implement solutions to common problems, be they economic growth or monetary policies, peace in Europe, human rights compliance, or a sustainable environment.
Legitimacy as justifiability
Normative concepts of legitimacy are now often expressed in terms of justifiability among political equals -for instance, by appeals to hypothetical acceptance or consent. The legitimacy of a political order such as the EU is seen as an issue of whether affected parties would have or could have accepted it, under appropriate choice conditions. They 'ask whether the coercive exercise of political power could be reasonably accepted by citizens considered free and equal and who possess both a capacity for and a desire to enter into fair terms of cooperation ' (Choudhry 2001, 383) .
We may thus say that laws or authorities are legally legitimate insofar as they are enacted and exercised in accordance with constitutional rules and appropriate procedures. They are socially legitimate if subjects are disposed to actually abide by them. Finally, they are normatively legitimate insofar as they can be justified to the people living under them, and impose a moral duty on them to comply.
Normative theorists often take various forms of normative legitimacy to be fundamental, but they overlook the other aspects at their peril. 5 I submit that the three other concepts of legitimacy also seem normatively relevant. They can be mutually re-enforcing -legal legitimacy in the form of constitutionalism and the rule of law is often held to be a necessary condition of the justifiability of a political order. General compliance on its own is insufficient for normative legitimacy -people may comply with unjust rule solely from fear of sanctions, lack of alternatives, or unreflective habit. Yet compliance often requires that the population believe that the institutions are normatively legitimate. Members of a system may accept a decision out of fear, expediency, habit, or lethargy. But typically, the capacity of the authorities to rule is closely connected to the widespread belief that the occupants of the political positions of authority have a right to command, with a concomitant obligation of other members of the system to obey (Easton 1965, 207-8; Beetham and Lord 1998, 10) .
Perceived normative legitimacy may also bolster the problem-solving capacity of governments, insofar as citizens are more likely to comply with commands they believe to be justified (Dehousse 1999). These four concepts of legitimacy focus on somewhat different aspects of institutional arrangements that serve to secure legitimacy. Several institutional mechanisms grant legitimation to authorities by means of express consent, affirmation or recognition by their subordinates or other legitimate authorities (Beetham 1991) . The various institutionalized procedures merit careful attention.
Legitimation through participation
The legitimacy of the EU is sometimes sought by including citizens, interest groups, or experts in the decision process (Andersen and Burns 1996, 245; Banchoff and Smith 1999a, 11) . Citizens may be drawn into political decisions at various stages, and may participate directly in referendums -with varying results (Abromeit 1998). And certain forms of participation may certainly boost compliance, especially when parties consulted can bind their members in forms of network governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999).
Legitimation through democratic accountability
One important form of participation is representative democracy, where citizens hold rulers accountable for their use of public power by selecting among competing candidate parties on the basis of informed discussion of their relative merits and the objectives to be pursued. 6 This democratic element of domestic political rule is regarded as central to legitimation and legitimacy across Europe -and, some hold, globally (Norris 1999a) .
Some critics of the EU have charged that democratic measures are underdeveloped, so as to prevent member-state governments and parliaments from democratic control. The increased power of the European Parliament granted in the Constitutional Treaty would have enhanced such legitimacy, on the basis of European elections among competing Euro-parties.
Legitimation through actual consent
Some writers place great importance on institutional arrangements where the subordinates and other authorities expressly grant consent or affirm the authorities as legitimate, and where other legitimate authorities expressly recognize them (Beetham 1991) . Some normative theories in the discourse ethics tradition seem to hold that the actual acceptance of a normative justification is required for normative legitimacy (Habermas 1979, 200; McCarthy 1994, 46) . Others, including David Beetham and Christopher Lord, hold that . . . consent is almost wholly subsumed in the authorisation of government through the electoral process. Where the governed themselves decide who is to govern them, there is no further need of actions or ceremonies expressive of their consent beyond the electoral procedure for appointment to office. (Beetham and Lord 1998, 8) This focus may be typical of normative concepts of legitimacy or legitimation -for instance, because actual consent indicates that the interests of all are secured -, but may well also be desirable for problem solving when parties collectively bind themselves to certain options.
Legitimation through output
The problem solving or 'output' legitimation of the EU requires that organizations and member states explore, identify, agree to, and implement options that benefit them all (Jachtenfuchs 1995; Karlsson 2001, 273) . The Union must then go on to actually secure these options, achieving objectives hitherto out of reach (Banchoff and Smith 1999b) . Central mechanisms to achieve this are the ability to create de facto binding and sanctioned law, and the ability to make credible commitments through regulatory agencies. For instance, the common currency prevents unilateral exchange-rate adjustments, and an independent central bank can bolster the credibility of member states' commitment to sound monetary policies (Majone 1998b) . These arrangements bind member states and enforce compliance, and thus prevent such free-riding that often threatens cooperative arrangements (Beetham and Lord 1998; Scharpf 1999 ).
Six objects of legitimacy
I submit that the many contributions about legitimacy, legitimation, and the EU, in fact, address different objects or institutional levels, where the different concepts and institutional arrangements clearly apply better to some levels than others. 7 Discussions may concern
• a particular political decision -a policy or piece of legislation. Questions of their legitimacy typically concern their legality: whether they have been enacted by duly authorized officials.
• the authorities -the political actors: office holders, a particular government or set of representatives. Their legitimacy is mainly an issue of legitimation: whether they have been legitimated through democratic elections, delegation, or other rightful sources of authority.
• particular public institutions such as the European Central Bank.
Challenges to their legitimacy might be of all four kinds. Their social legitimacy in the form of compliance may be explored systematically (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, ch. 4); others may challenge whether they were legally established or whether they achieve their stated objectives; and, finally, one may ask whether the institution -including its objective -is normatively justifiable.
• the regime, that is, the political order as a whole. Questions about its legitimacy can, again, be of the four different kinds: whether there is general compliance with the rules and authorities, or how to assess the consistency of procedural norms and authority structures that make up the formal and informal rules of the game. Another central issue is, of course, the problem-solving ability of the system: whether the EU does obtain the objectives stated in the treaties reasonably well. Finally, we may ask whether the regime can be justified to those subject to it.
• the regime principles. These would be questions about the legitimacy of certain objectives and ideals of the EU, such as general welfare, participation, or the rule of law, and the scope of decisions and division of powers between the institutions (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, ch. 3). The central issues here seem to be matters of normative and problem-solving legitimacy. Legality is also at stake, at least in the sense that the member states' constitutions may restrict the powers of Union bodies.
• the political community: the set of individuals participating in and maintaining common decision-making processes for these ends. The legitimacy at stake here is typically normative. Should there be European regimes that include this particular set of states and their individuals? Discussions of whether there is a European demos concern this issue, as well as the profound questions about the appropriate borders of Europe. Can Turkey be included in the EU?
There are important interconnections between the various concepts of legitimacy and legitimation regarding these six objects. Regarding social legitimacy in the form of political support, Easton notes the importance of 'diffuse' institutional, regime, and community support to ensure specific support. 8 Citizens may maintain diffuse support for the regime for a while even if unsatisfied with present policy outputs, as long as these policies generally remain consistent with the regime values and objectives, including procedural justice and a sense of fair treatment (Inglehart 1999b, 98; Miller and Listhaug 1999) .
Political philosophy about normative legitimacy may contribute to such diffuse support for the regime when it persuades members that they have a common good. However, such support is only conditional. Normative arguments about legitimacy may also serve to reduce what diffuse support there is, unless members believe that the authorities and the regime do in fact promote that common good (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 318-19) . Normative arguments may also serve to convince citizens that their leaders and their institutions do not merit compliance, and indeed, that this assessment should be widely shared. These assessments of legitimacy combine empirical and normative elements, and may thus be important in their own right to boost or reduce expectations of general compliance.
The different concepts of legitimacy and legitimation combined with an awareness of these different levels can provide alternative, possibly complementary 'frames' for understanding the legitimacy challenges facing the EU. Both diffuse and specific support may be at stake, due to European integration and expansion. Support for the regime as a whole is not forthcoming 'from below' -witness the popular dissatisfaction with the Maastricht Treaty -nor is there general agreement about the regime values and objectives of the EU, and about whether the Union's 'outcome' achieves those objectives reasonably well.
Ways forward: democratic accountability, human rights
Unfortunately, taxonomies alone do not alleviate the legitimacy deficits. Different recommendations for institutional changes and the extent of future European integration are mutually incompatible (Kohler-Koch 2000) . Reforms will often strengthen some forms of legitimacy at the expense of others. Efficiency, democracy, and constitutionalism may obviously conflict, even in principle (Elster and Slagstad 1988) . Mechanisms of veto and other arrangements that require actual consent may hinder efficient problem solving (Tsebelis 1990; Scharpf 1999) . Accountability may stifle creative searches for solutions (Scharpf 1999; Naurin 2004) . Some argue that increased democratization and politicization of the EU Commission is likely to threaten its problem-solving capacity and its credibility as neutral guardian of the treaties. 9 The authority to tax and redistribute may increase the problem-solving ability of the EU, but at the expense of participation and democratic accountability (Börzel and Hosli 2003) . I shall defend some recommendations over others, on the basis of one understanding of normative legitimacy.
How might these dilemmas of alleviating the legitimacy deficits be addressed? Normative theorists pursue several different strategies of reasoned reconciliation. 10 Some deny that problem solving or compliance are plausible concepts of 'legitimation', and instead hold that normative legitimacy is fundamental (Beetham and Lord 1998). However, it still seems appropriate to consider when, if at all, problem solving and compliance are normatively relevant for legitimacy. Indeed, some argue that since the EU is sui generis as a political order, other standards might be appropriate, such as non-majoritarian and 'post-parliamentary' standards and models of accountability (Majone 1994 Andersen and Burns 1996; Héritier 1999) . In this vein, some argue that EU arrangements such as comitology are or can be embryonic arenas for 'deliberative politics' (Joerges and Vos 1999, 311).
However, these arguments seem flawed. While the EU is certainly complex and unique, the tradition of federalism suggests that many aspects of the Union are similar to those found in federal arrangements -which all in fact tend to be sui generis responses to particular problems of joint and separate rule. Neither the complexity nor the unique features support the conclusion that standard normative principles are inappropriate (Beetham and Lord 1998). Still, one point seems well taken. The complexity and multilevel nature of the EU forces us to reconsider the reasons for requiring democratic accountability through elections in the first place.
We may benefit from an account that identifies some of the central arguments and concerns, that can guide discussions concerning tradeoffs, scope, and institutional design. In the following, I sketch one such perspective on legitimacy. I suggest that we should distinguish between the normative legitimacy of a political order or regime and the more demanding conditions for when citizens have a political obligation to abide by such rules and commands. The latter requires more than that the rules are normatively legitimate. Citizens have a political obligation only if such rules are also actually generally complied with. On this account, a normative duty to obey political commands requires, first, that the commands, rulers, and regime are normatively legitimate, and second, that citizens also have reason to trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with such commands and regimes.
Such trustworthiness of institutions and fellow citizens seems necessary for long-term support for the multilevel political order, and for authorities' ability to govern. Normative political theory may thus contribute decisively to the promotion of long-term stability. Politicians and academics may be right to worry about the long-term consequences of an 'apparent' legitimacy deficit in the form of low levels of public support for institutions, policies, and authorities. Long-term support for the EU requires not only present compliance and support, but also long-term trust in the general compliance of others -both citizens and officials -and a shared acceptance of the legality and normative legitimacy of the regime. The different suggestions for enhancing legitimacy of the EU may best be assessed and combined in light of how they can contribute to such trustworthiness.
The seven contributions of institutions
The assurance problems among contingent compliers were addressed already by Rousseau (Madison 1975; Rousseau 1978, 2.4.5) . A 'contingent complier' decides to comply with rules and otherwise cooperate with officials' decisions because she (a) perceives the government as trustworthy in making and enforcing normatively legitimate policies; and (b) has confidence that other actors, both officials and citizens, will do their part.
For a contingent complier to decide to comply, she must be assured on both of these counts. Social institutions can promote trust and trustworthiness among such contingent compliers in several ways. Recent work on the theory of games and research on social capital sheds further light on how institutions can bolster expectations concerning others' actions to affect the complex assurance problems that contingent compliers face.
11 They can reduce the likelihood that others default -for instance, by shifting the trusted's incentives. They can also reduce the costs of failed trust -for instance, through restrictions on the scope of legal political decisions and human rights that protect minorities. 12 Closer scrutiny reveals that institutions can provide assurance of at least seven relevant kinds. With regard to the first condition, perception of the government as pursuing normatively legitimate policies:
(a) civil society can foster the development and dissemination of a plausible public political theory that provides normative legitimacy by laying out and defending the objectives and normative standards of the political order: democracy, subsidiarity, solidarity, and human rights. This is one important reason why governmental institutions should promote civil society -for instance, by ensuring freedom of speech and association. (b) institutions must be sufficiently simple and transparent to allow assessment. (c) the institutions must be seen to be generally sufficiently effective and efficient according to the prevailing normative objectives and standards. Institutions may also help provide public assurance about the second condition of general compliance. (d) institutions can be seen to socialize individuals to be conditional compliers -for instance, in the educational system, or in political parties that foster somewhat consistent and responsive policy platforms. (e) institutions can include mechanisms that can be trusted to monitor whether the policy or authority actually solves the problems aimed for. (f ) institutions can include mechanisms that can be trusted to monitor the compliance of citizens and authorities with the legal rules. (g) finally, institutions can provide sanctions that modify or reinforce citizens' and authorities' incentives, to increase the likelihood that others will also comply.
The following brief comments point to some areas where the institutions of the EU -and by extension, those of other international bodies and regimes -may fall short on these seven modes of bolstering trust and trustworthiness. I focus, for purposes of exposition, on conditions for democratic accountability, since democratic rule is a central domestic standard of legitimacy that is of contested relevance at the EU level.
We can note several conditions that must be satisfied to some extent if democratic accountability is to provide the various forms of assurance needed. At present, some of these conditions are not sufficiently satisfied in the EU. Hence, insofar as there are arrangements for democratic accountability, they may not provide assurance to the requisite degree.
(a) With regard to civil society and its role in facilitating a public political theory, political parties are crucial. One important aspect of competitive politics is the existence of opposition parties. A critical opposition and media scrutiny greatly assist citizens who try to judge the authorities' agenda and performance. As the EU is currently designed, there is little room for a rival set of leadership candidates and a rival policy agenda, although the rejection by the European Parliament of Commission President Barroso's first proposed slate of Commissioners illustrates that there is some room for contestation. (b) With regard to simplicity and transparency of the rules themselves, the decision structures must make it possible to place responsibility for policy decisions with sufficient clarity (Manin, Przeworksi and Stokes 1999) . Within the EU, the plethora of multilevel modes of governance and multiple modes of decision making make for even more opacity. (c) To ensure effectiveness and assure the public of the same, a working system of party competition and active opposition is of great value, and should be sustainable within the governing institutions. Indeed, parties seem crucial for democratic arrangements to be reasonably responsive to the best interests of voters. Consider that party contestation is important for opinion formation and informed policy choice. Contestation is also important for credible monitoring, for the exploration of alternatives and externalities, for scrutiny of the actual choices, and to determine and monitor effective resource use -in addition to the scrutiny of government that is central to the seven contributions of institutions mentioned above. (d) Party contestation is also crucial for socialization and preference formation. Many scholars point to the importance of federation-wide parties that compete at several levels of the multilevel political order (Linz 1999) . Such competition fosters political debate and the formation of public opinion about the best means and objectives of policies that heed and accommodate the interests of both the subunit population and those of other Union citizens. These debates allow voters to form their preferences on complex policy issues on the basis of alternatives that all claim to be committed to the interests of others in the Union in 'overarching loyalty' (Linz 1999). Another benefit of opposition parties is that they seem crucial to mobilize voters, because only then can people see the impact of their votes. A necessary condition for allegiance to the political system is also that there be real competition with a plausible chance for losers to one day win (Shapiro 1996 (Shapiro , 2001 . (e) Trustworthy monitoring of the responsiveness of officials to the real interests of citizens over time requires that the information flow should not be controlled by the present government. To reduce the opportunities for deception and underperformance, the opposition parties, critical media, and independent research all help alleviate the information asymmetry between the government and voters. Electoral contests foster rival policy ideas and candidates for political office. These help voters realize which choices may be made and give them some alternatives (Manin 1987, 338-68 To sum up, democratic contestation for power among competing political parties provides many important forms of assurance, in ways that can enhance the reasons why contingent compliers will decide to complyinsofar as the institutions are indeed found to be legitimate, and insofar as others are seen to comply for the most part. Thus these trust-building institutions may serve important functions to secure that contingent compliers act on their normative duty to obey. Alas, the present practices in the EU stand in some contrast to this account. Compared to many domestic democracies, there are few if any vehicles for encouraging a Europe-wide debate about the public political theory of the EU. The relative lack of public arenas for political discussion makes it difficult to mobilize political opposition. But their absence may be temporary, since the requisite public debates and forums are likely to develop as political contestation among parties increases. Thus pessimism about European-level democracy should not be overstated. There are signs of more party organization and competition in the European Parliament, and more policy contestation within the Council of Ministers. There are therefore openings for contestation about the EU's policy agenda, and for critical scrutiny of its performance. Optimists may thus hope that adjustments of the current institutions, and parties' learning how to utilize their opportunities, may provide for more political contestation about matters European. This may in the longer term facilitate assurance and trustworthiness.
International human rights regimes provide another set of assurance mechanisms that may help alleviate some of the assurance problems. In particular, human rights requirements make authorities accountable to courts -for instance, the European Court of Human Rights -that monitor and provide assurance that the authorities respect individuals' rights. Human rights constraints credibly monitored and enforced provide assurance that majorities will not ignore the fundamental interests of minorities. These arrangements bolster assurance in several ways. Human rights protections, first, reduce the likelihood of failed trust, by giving the trusted bodies disincentives to violate the human rights of the trusting citizen expects. Second, the arrangement reduces the costs of failed trust, by restricting the scope of valid (qualified) majority rule.
Human rights requirements can help hone transparency of institutions with regard to their impact on minorities; and the courts can provide assurance with regard to institutional effectiveness and efficiency as to human rights compliance. Courts can also monitor the problem solving and compliance of governments in this regard, and bolster targeted sanctions -primarily in the form of boosting the opposition in the next election, and by shaming the government in domestic and international arenas. The inclusion of human rights may also have a socializing effect, as some have claimed with regard to the political elites of new member states (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999) .
That this mode of accountability toward international courts of human rights is not democratic in any obvious way. Indeed, I submit that the absence of accountability of these courts to the governments they must judge may increase the trustworthiness of the courts. The courts' finding that a government is in compliance with human rights is more credible insofar as they are independent of any government, and hence cannot so easily be suspected of taking instructions from politicians.
Conclusion
I have sought to argue that some of the terms and institutions of normative legitimacy and legitimation should apply to entities 'beyond the state', especially to the European Union. Some central questions of normative legitimacy are also relevant for international or supranational bodies, at least insofar as they must address problems of assurance among contingent compliers. It does seem appropriate to ask whether international regimes can be justified to all who contribute to maintain them. This normative requirement does apply also for institutional entities beyond the state. In the domestic setting, such a justification seems to require democracy and human rights.
At the international level, other arrangements than democratic accountability may well better provide the functional equivalent. Still, I have suggested that standards of democratic accountability do seem appropriate for some international bodies such as the European Union. Whether democratic arrangements are also appropriate for international or transnational public or private bodies in general remains an open question. While trust building does seem necessary also at the international level, it remains to be explored whether other trust-building mechanisms than democratic contestation, such as human rights courts, might suffice at the global level.
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